Dealing with government departments

  • Ask for the name of the person that you are dealing with for future reference.
  • Keep copies of documents provided to each department (record the date, person and section they are sent to).

Getting time off work

  • Speak to your superiors and colleagues, and explain your situation.-Suggest a possible compromise – Friday afternoons off for an extra 35 minutes a day.-Set a period of time for this then review it.
  • Know your limitations and let others know them too.

Smaller social network

  • Consider volunteering where the work is done on a group basis e.g. fire rescue service, life saving, your child’s school Parents and Friends network.

Learning to cook

  • Ask a friend to teach you to cook in exchange for doing some handy work, mowing their lawn, baby sitting or help with some other project they might have on.
  • Borrow a book from the library on cooking basic meals.

Maintaining the car

  • Look on the web for information on your brand of car.
  • Get road service membership such as NRMA, RACQ etc for when you lock your keys in the car, have a flat tyre, your battery suddenly goes dead, or your car breaks down in an inconvenient location.
  • Take a course in car maintenance.

Shopping for groceries

  • Look on the web for home shopping grocery sites such as Coles or Woolworths.-Browse through each section and make a list of what you need – use this as a prompter each time you shop.-It also gives you an idea of the costs involved.
  • Generic food brands are often cheaper and just as good as the label brands.

Less money

  • Contact your local utility service company to arrange instalment payments for your electricity, telephone, insurance rates etc.
  • Join a group that buys groceries in bulk – this can be cheaper.-These are usually co-ops or local community groups.

Managing relationships

  • Ensure that the important people in your children’s lives are invited to school plays, religious ceremonies, music recitals, sports events etc.

Understanding your children’s routine

  • Have a calendar or notebook with important dates highlighted, e.g. sports carnival, swimming carnival, parent reading at school, doctors appointments, weekend sports locations, etc.

Organising care for the kids

  • Talk to your child’s school and see what school care programs you can access e.g. before and after-school care, and holiday programs.
  • Place a notice for parents in the school newsletter requesting child minding after school.-In return, offer something that you can do for the other parent.
  • Enquire with your local community service provider about available child care programs.

Extract from “What about Me?” Practical ideas on looking after yourself after separation.

Extract from “Separating Respectfully” written by Lynne Clark B.S.W. Master of Family Therapy

“Your children will need to know what is taking place so that they can be reassured about how they are going to fit in their separated family structure.-They need to be told that they will be maintaining their ongoing relationships with both parents.

They are not to be informed of each parent’s story about what has taken place.-This is not the children’s business.-Ideally, parents should tell their children the same story, perhaps that their parents have decided to separate because they are no longer happy living together (or something similar).-You might like to add that everyone will feel a little sad and upset for while.-Older children may request a more detailed explanation.-While it can sometimes be a difficult task, information they are given should never include denigrating comments about the other parent.

More importantly, rather than lengthy explanation regarding why the separation is taking place, children need a lot of reassurance that they will continue to see both their parents, along with reassurance about how their parents will be arranging for this to take place.-They need reassurance that they will continue to be loved by both parents and that their wellbeing will be prioritised.-They also need to be reassured that they did not contribute in any way to their parent’s decision to separate. 

By reassuring your children and not involving them in your dispute, you will be protecting their emotional wellbeing.”

Misattributed paternity (sometimes referred to as paternity fraud) is the situation when the person who is thought to be the child’s father, is not the child’s biological father.

Estimates as to the incidences of misattributed paternity vary from country to country however the rate commonly quoted is at about 10%.[i] In Australia, the rate of misattributed paternity in contested case is said to be about 20%.[ii]

A common circumstance where the fact of paternity is an issue is with respect to an application for child support. Obviously the issue can arise in other matters (such as with respect to a parenting matter – aka “child custody”) however combining the emotional aspects of the infidelity, loss of a child and past/ongoing financial obligations, it is submitted these matters have an emotional depth beyond what family lawyers may generally encounter.

In the author’s experience family lawyers like to steer clear of emotional issues where possible and I am no exception. What follows is a brief summary of the law with respect to the interaction between paternity, child support laws, parentage testing and recovery of child support paid.

When is someone a father?

The Family Law Act 1975 (“FLA”) provides for a number of presumptions with respect to identifying who is the father of a child. These presumptions arise from:

  • Marriage[iii]
  • Cohabitation[iv]
  • Registration of birth[v]
  • Findings of courts[vi]
  • Acknowledgments of parentage[vii]

Section 69U provides these presumptions are rebuttable by proof on the balance of probabilities.

Other provisions of Commonwealth legislation identify who is a parent of a child born through artificial conception, surrogacy arrangements or adoption (in the family law context) but these will not be examined here.

Issue of paternity

If paternity is an issue in the proceeding, a declaration of parentage can be sought pursuant to section 69VA FLA which is conclusive evidence of parentage for the purposes of all laws of the Commonwealth.

Provisions which assist with obtaining the necessary evidence are contained within Part VII, Division 12, Subdivision E (and include orders for parentage testing – section 69W FLA).

Who is a liable parent for child support purposes and when is child support payable?

Section 3 of the Child Support Assessment Act 1989 (CSAA) provides parents have a primary duty to maintain their children.

Section 29 CSAA sets out who is a parent and is in many respects not dissimilar to the presumptions referred to in the FLA.

A number of other sections identify who may apply and who is liable to pay child support. In summary, child support liability arises when:

  • There is an eligible child;[viii]
  • An application is made by a parent[ix] or eligible carer;[x]
  • The parents are not living together on a genuine domestic basis[xi]
  • The liable parent[xii] is living in Australia or in a reciprocating jurisdiction[xiii]

If the above conditions are met, and the child support Registrar is satisfied the application is made in accordance with the manner specified in section 150A CSAA, child support will be payable by the liable parent.

What recourse is there when an assessment of child support is made and paternity is in dispute?

There are a number of provisions of the CSAA that can assist in the event the liable parent does not believe they are the father of the child; and the eligible parent is not willing to assist.

A person aggrieved may bring an application in a court having jurisdiction under the CSAA and FLA. The most appropriate court is the Federal Circuit Court.

Final orders sought in the application

Section 107 CSAA allows a person to apply for a declaration that they “should not be assessed in respect of the costs of the child because the person is not a parent of the child”. To grant the declaration the court needs to be satisfied the person is not a parent.

Final orders for recovery of amounts paid where no liability exists can also be made pursuant to section 143 CSAA.

The nature of the relief is a final order and the application should be supported by an affidavit setting out the facts relied upon and a financial statement.

Importantly, a time limit applies to applications for declarations under section 107 CSAA that they be made “within the time prescribed by the applicable Rules of Court or within such further time as is allowed under the applicable Rules of Court.”[xiv]

The applicable rules of the Federal Circuit Court are Rule 25A.06 Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 court which state:

“A person must file an application for a declaration under subsection 106A(2) or 107(1) of the Assessment Act within 56 days of the service on the applicant of a notice given under section 33 or 34 of that Act.”

Thus the time limit is within 56 days from service of the notice of the Registrar’s decision.

If the application is out of time, leave can be sought to proceed. Section 107 provides the application can be brought “within such further time as is allowed under the applicable Rules of Court.”

Rule 1.06 Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 allows the court to dispense with compliance with the Rules in the “interests of justice” and; pursuant to Rule 3.05 the court may extend or shorten time fixed by the Rules.

The case law indicates that a satisfactory explanation for the delay will usually be sufficient[xv].

In Levine & Levine [2011] FMCAfam 821 the application was brought out of time when the child was 14. The evidence was that the mother made comments regarding paternity from the time the child was 4 years and the “father” had caught her in a compromising position with a neighbour 7 years before the child was born. The “father” became increasingly suspicious until he conducted his own DNA test without the mother or child’s knowledge. He first sought to deal with the matter without litigation before bringing his application within a year.

The court allowed the application to proceed and referred to similar facts described in DRP & AJL [2004] FMCAfam 440 at 17:

“There was nothing, of which the applicant was aware, which would have led him to have any doubt as to the paternity of the child. It is not appropriate to suggest that the applicant ought to have taken any active steps to inquire of the mother as to the paternity of the child when the child was conceived in a matrimonial relationship where there was no suggestion of infidelity. Indeed, to make such enquiries would be offensive and destructive to the relationship that most married spouses enjoy. There is no conduct of the applicant, with respect to these issues, that should be the subject of criticism.”

Recovery of child support payments

If the court grants the declaration pursuant to section 107 CSAA, then the court may consider the recovery of any child support paid.

The relevant considerations for recovery pursuant to section 143 CSAA were examined in detail in DRP & AJL.

Section 143 CSAA requires that the order be “just and equitable for the purposes of adjusting, or giving effect to, the rights of the parties and of the child concerned”. In examining a range of decisions at 25 to 26 Riethmuller FM held:

The term `just and equitable’ cannot be interpreted to simply mean `unfettered individual opinion’ as this would not provide a sufficiently certain definition to allow for the discretion to be an exercise of judicial power: Cominos v Cominos [1972] HCA 54; (1972) 127 C.L.R. 588. As a result, the process of considering the issues arising under section 143 must be approached judicially, and the factors relevant to the exercise of the discretion in the particular case identified and applied….In determining the relevant factors under section 143 the features of the child support scheme and general law that relate to these issues should be considered to place section 143 in its broader context.

In discussing the “broader context” His Honour went on to examine the circumstances in which adoption or artificial conception procedures may give rise to liability under the CSAA, section 29 CSAA when the Registrar will presume paternity, maintenance liabilities of step parents pursuant to the FLA.[xvi] His Honour made the fair point it would not be just and equitable to require money to be repaid where a step parent liability may arise under the FLA.

There are a number of factors set out in section 143(3) CSAA that apply to the court ordering money paid to be refund after a declaration is made under section 107 CSAA. With respect to these factors, His Honour noted prima facie the applicant had an entitlement to a refund and the list of factors at section 143(3) CSAA we not limited.[xvii]

In most cases however the following factors will generally be relevant:

  • The state of knowledge and conduct of the parties. It will be necessary to determine the state of knowledge of the payer at all relevant times (time of birth, during the relationship, at separation, and thereafter). The court will also consider whether a reasonable person would doubt being the father and any acquiescence or delay;
  • The relationship of the payer with the child. Of particular relevance must be the extent to which the payer has taken on the role of a parent and provider for the child.
  • Evidence as to the circumstances of the biological father. The biological father’s relationship with the child and capacity to provide support.
  • The financial circumstances of the parties. This will be particularly important when the repayment will place a burden upon the mother that will cause a significant detriment to the standard of living of the child. In many cases it will also be relevant that the mother has received an adjustment in her favour pursuant to section 75(2) FLA in the property settlement on the basis that the child is a biological child of the payer.

Interim orders/directions sought

There are a number of interim orders and directions that can be made prior to the final declaration. These are important with respect to the evidence necessary to obtain the declaration and protect the financial position of the applicant.

Interim orders/direction that can be sought are:

  • A stay of payments of child support;
  • That necessary “DNA” parentage testing is performed.

Stay of child support payments

The power to order a stay is contained within section 111C Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988 (“CSRCA”). Section 111C(3) provides, “The court may make such orders as the court considers appropriate staying … if the court considers that it is desirable to do so, taking into account the interests of the persons who may be affected by the outcome of the proceeding.”

In Ahern & Ahern & Anor (SSAT Appeal) [2012] FMCAfam 1299 (23 November 2012) the court said at 22 to 25:

In order to show an arguable case, a party does not need to demonstrate that he or she has a strong case, let alone one that is bound to succeed…Whilst the claim does not appear to be overwhelmingly persuasive; it is far from a hopeless case. Thus, I am satisfied that the Applicant has shown that he has an arguable case, a serious question to be tried on appeal.

The court went on to consider any hardship from the point of view of both parties.

In Penman & Child Support Registrar & Anor (No3) [2013] FCCA 1124 (13 August 2013) the court at 15 set out in detail what should be taken into account in deciding whether to grant a stay:

  • “The onus to establish a proper basis for the stay is on the applicant for the stay. However it is not necessary for the applicant to demonstrate any “special” or “exceptional” circumstances;
  • A person who has obtained a judgment is entitled to the benefit of that judgment;
  • A person who has obtained a judgment is entitled to presume the judgment is correct;
  • The mere filing of an appeal is insufficient to grant a stay;
  • The bona fides of the applicant;
  • A stay may be granted on terms that are fair to all parties – this may involve a court weighing the balance of convenience and the competing rights of the parties;
  • A weighing of the risk that an appeal may be rendered nugatory if a stay is not granted – this will be a substantial factor in determining whether it will be appropriate to grant a stay;
  • Some preliminary assessment of the strength of the proposed appeal – whether the appellant has an arguable case;
  • The period of time in which the appeal can be heard and whether existing satisfactory arrangements may support the granting of the stay for a short period of time.”

“DNA” parentage testing

If parentage is an issue in the proceeding the court can order that parentage testing be performed (i.e. DNA testing).

The necessity for there to be “an issue” was recently examined again in the decision of Whitley & Ingham [2013] FCCA 869(22 July 2013). In this case the court did not allow parentage testing to establish whether a deceased man could be added to a child’s birth certificate, and the man’s death certificate, affirming that parentage testing is not a “free standing power.”

Section 69W FLA provides that the court, a party or an ICL may apply for a parentage testing order. The people who can be tested are the child, the person known to be the mother or “any other person, if the court is of the opinion that…the information that could be obtained might assist in determining the parentage of the child.”

To obtain an order for parentage testing a threshold was applied in TNL & CYT (2005) FamCA 77 applied in F & Z [2005] FMCAfam 394 at 58 and described as two hurdles. Firstly, parentage must be relevant to the nature of the proceedings and secondly, there must be evidence that places parentage in doubt.

With respect to the second “hurdle”, the Full Court in TNL & CYT approved earlier decisions that the applicant must have an “honest, bona fide and reasonable belief as to the doubt.”

The court in F & Z went on to describe the parentage presumptions contained within the FLA as the default position. Where an applicant with an honest, bona fide and reasonable doubt leads even relatively weak evidence to rebut the presumption, the order for testing should be granted.

In Tryon & Clutterbuck [2007] FamCA 580 (4 May 2007) it was confirmed an order pursuant to section 69W is a parenting order and as such the best interests of the child is the paramount consideration[xviii]and the matters in section 60CC in so far as they are relevant should be considered.

In circumstances where a person refuses to submit to a parentage test, the court may draw an inference from the failure to comply.

In Levine the mother failed to comply with an order for testing and the court drawing an inference from her failure, combined with the earlier test conducted by the father, made a finding the applicant was not the father.

In Nandi & Listberg [2013] FamCA 419 (6 June 2013) the father refused to comply with an order for testing and a parentage presumption was therefore not rebutted.

Conclusion

If you are preparing an affidavit for this type of application, in my opinion the following checklist should be applied:

  • Set out the back ground facts and any evidence that raises doubt as to paternity;
  • If doubt as to paternity is in the mind of the applicant, set out any facts leading to the “honest, bona fide and reasonable belief as to the doubt.”
  •  If there is any delay in bringing the application, explain why the delay has occurred;
  • If a stay is sought, greater detail with respect to the 3 points above will assist in establishing an arguable case. Also, ensure the financial statement is completed in detail with documentary evidence where available to establish any “hardship”. Address what the other party may say with respect to hardship in the affidavit;
  • Do some research as to who is available to provide appropriate testing and have a panel with estimated costs set out in the affidavit;
  • In anticipation of the application being successful, and recovery of child support is sought, set out evidence in relation to state of knowledge and conduct of the parties, the circumstances of the applicant’s relationship with the child (whether there will be future contact, is the biological father known and likely to provide support, the financial circumstances of the parties and in particular the mother’s capacity to repay;
  • Be mindful to include any justice and equity circumstances why the funds should be repaid considering any other factors present.

As stated above, there is no doubt these types of matters can be some of the most heart wrenching that litigants and children can be involved in.

As well as good family law advice, an open mind can also be important for litigants.

In Levine the putative father rejected the child after the parentage test. The court noted at 77 to 79 in the context of examining the relationship between the applicant and child under section 143 CSAA:

The evidence suggests that this child is still unaware that the Applicant is not his father. For him, this has been an unfortunate situation not of his own making. In January 2009, the parties separated and the person whom the child thought was his father moved out of the matrimonial home. Less than a year and a half later, the child’s father figure no longer has anything to do with him. Effectively, he is now without a father, through no fault of his own.

From the child’s point of view, his father (as he thought) has rejected him, for no apparent reason. The Applicant’s desire to find out the truth about the child’s paternity will result in a financial benefit to him, at the expense of “collateral damage” to the child.

One might well ask why, if [X] does not know about the result of the paternity test, the Applicant should not continue to give this child the benefit of his time, support and encouragement. An adult can still have a loving, nurturing relationship with a child even if the adult is not the child’s biological parent. Australian society is full of people who have loving relationships with their step-children or adopted children.

 


[i] Rincon P (11 February 2009). “Study debunks illegitimacy ‘myth'”

[ii] Gilding, Michael (26 July 2011). “The fatherhood myth: Michael Gilding unravels the uncertain data about mistaken paternity”

[iii] Section 69P FLA

[iv] Section 69Q FLA

[v] Section 69R FLA

[vi] Section 69S FLA

[vii] Section 69T FLA

[viii] Sections 19,20,21 and 22 CSAA

[ix] Section 25 CSAA

[x] Section 25A CSAA

[xi] Section 25(b) CSAA

[xii] Section 5 liable parent is, “in the case of an administrative assessment–a parent by whom child support is payable for the child under the administrative assessment.”

[xiii] Section 29A CSAA

[xiv] Section 107(2)

[xv] See Levine & Levine [2011] FMCAfam 821

[xvi] Section 66M, 66N and 66D(2) FLA

[xvii] DRP & AJL [2004] FMCAfam 440 at 65 and 66

[xviii] Section 60CA FLA

 

Peter Hooper – Hooper Mill Family Lawyers – We are family lawyers in Brisbane. Find us searching family lawyers Brisbane; divorce lawyers Brisbane; family lawyer Brisbane; Brisbane family lawyers; family law solicitors Brisbane; divorce lawyer Brisbane; family law lawyers Brisbane; divorce solicitors Brisbane; divorce lawyers in Brisbane; best divorce lawyer Brisbane.

Article – PDF – What is a defacto relationship

In 2008, the Family Law Amendment (De Facto Financial Matters and Other Measures) Act 2008 was passed and substantially came into force on 1 March 2009. This Act had the effect of integrating de facto relationships into Federal Law and thus making de facto couples covered by the jurisdiction of the Family Court and Federal Circuit Court. This is true for all states and territories bar Western Australia, who has not referred the relevant powers to the Commonwealth and therefore still deal with de facto matters under state law.[1]

The Act made amendments to the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“FLA”) that extend financial settlement to parties in de facto relationships, whether they are in a heterosexual or same sex relationship. De facto parties are now eligible to seek property adjustment and maintenance orders in the same capacity as married couples have been able to in the past.

A de facto relationship is now defined in section 4AA(1)  of the FLA as:

“A person is in a de facto relationship with another person If:

(a)  The persons are not legally married to each other; and

(b)  The persons are not related by family (see subsection (6)); and

(c)  Having regard to all circumstances of their relationship, they have a relationship as a couple living together on a genuine domestic basis.”

The circumstances referred to at s 4AA(1) subsection (c) above are outline in s 4AA(2) and include any or all of the following:

(a)  “The duration of the relationship;

(b)  The nature and extent of their common residence;

(c)  Whether a sexual relationship exists;

(d)  The degree of financial dependence or interdependence, and any arrangements for financial support, between them;

(e)  The ownership, use and acquisition of their property;

(f)   The degree of mutual commitment to a shared life;

(g)  Whether the relationship is or was registered under a prescribed law of a State or Territory as a prescribed kind of relationship;

(h)  The care and support of children;

(i)    The reputation and public aspect of the relationship.”

All the above factors are relevant considerations, however it is not necessary to make a finding that one or more of the above factors existed to decide whether or not there was a de facto relationship. The court has a wide discretion when determining whether a de facto relationship exists or not. This is evidenced in the legislation where it states “the court is entitled to have regard to, and attach weight to, any matters that seem appropriate to the court in the circumstances of the case.”[2]

The legislation also specifically mentions that a de facto relationship can exist if the parties are a same sex or heterosexual couple and even if one of the parties to the relationship is married to someone else or is in a concurrent de facto relationship.[3]

The courts broad discretion has been exercised in many cases since the introduction of the new legislation. In Jonah & White [4] the parties were in a 17 years relationship that the women asserted was a de facto relationship but the man asserted it was an affair. The court determined that it was not a de facto relationship due to the secret nature of the relationship, the limitations of the relationship and the fact the parties were not identified to the public as having been in a relationship.

In Allenby & Kimble [5] the court took into account emails between the parties to help determine that the parties were in a de facto relationship. This was not the only factor however, the parties shared a bedroom and the man modified his property to allow the women to operate a business out of it that he derived no financial benefit from.

In Gissing & Sheffield [6] the applicant alleged that the parties were in a de factor relationship for 17 years that started out as a business relationship and then became a personal one. The respondent claimed that there was no de facto relationship and that it was merely a business relationship. The court found that a de facto relationship existed because the parties shared a common residence for significant periods of time, conducted joint bank accounts, shared income and payments of household expenses and the perception of their relationship to other persons. The court stated that on balance the evidence indicates the parties had merged their lives and for all practical purposes they were living on a genuine domestic basis.[7]

What happens after the court makes its determination?

After taking in all the circumstances contained in the legislation and relevant case law the court can make a declaration that a de facto relationship existed or didn’t exist.[8] This declaration has the effect of a judgment of the court.[9] However the court can only make such a declaration once it’s satisfied that the applicant or both parties were ordinarily resident in the participating jurisdiction when the proceedings were commenced.[10]

Once the court has determined that a de facto relationship exists it can only make a property adjustment or maintenance order in relation to a de facto relationship if it is satisfied of any of the following factors:[11]

(a)  “that the period, or the total periods, of the de facto relationship is at least 2 years; or

(b)  that there is a child of the de facto relationship; or

(c)  that

i.- the party to the de facto relationship who applies for the order or declaration made substantial contributions of a kind mentioned in paragraph 90SM(4)(a),(b) or (c); and

ii.-A failure to make the order or declaration would result in serious injustice to the applicant; or

(d) -That the relationship is or was registered under a prescribed law of a State or Territory.”

The court has a broad discretion to use any evidence relevant to the case at its disposal to find that a de facto relationship existed or did not exist. There is no black and white definition of what a de facto relationship is, as each case is different from the next.

Article written by Shaun Mill

 


[1] Australian Master Family Law Guide p 848

[2] FLA s 4AA(3)

[3] FLA s 4AA(5).

[4] [2011] Fam CA 221 per Murhpy J.

[5] [2012] FamCA 614.

[6] [2012] FMCAfam 1111.

[7] Gissing & Sheffield [2012] FMCAfam 1111, O’Sullivan FM at paras 192-198.

[8] FLA s 90RD.

[9] FLA s 90RE.

[10] FLA s 90RG.

[11] FLA s 90SB.

 

 

Peter Hooper – Hooper Mill Family Lawyers – We are family lawyers in Brisbane. Find us searching family lawyers Brisbane; divorce lawyers Brisbane; family lawyer Brisbane; Brisbane family lawyers; family law solicitors Brisbane; divorce lawyer Brisbane; family law lawyers Brisbane; divorce solicitors Brisbane; divorce lawyers in Brisbane; best divorce lawyer Brisbane.

Can you afford to Divorce? – Article written by Olivia Maragna and published by brisbanetimes.com.au

 

My Comment:

“I think another expense is the high costs of legal fees that can also flow from relationship breakdown.

My view is the importance of planning for high legal fees will depend upon the nature of the relationship; and likelihood of the separation being acrimonious. Bigger fights mean bigger fees and it’s no surprise to people who have experienced family law litigation that lawyers are the ones who can often profit the most.

I often tell my client that the smartest and least expensive way to resolve a dispute is to follow these steps:

  1. Before starting to negotiate, each party should obtain independent legal advice from a lawyer skilled in family law. Lawyers, who dabble in family law, don’t know the law, or who behave in an inflammatory manner can cost you money. My view is, to avoid doubt see a lawyer who is an accredited family law specialist;
  2. Armed with accurate advice, commence negotiation. Discuss with the other party what you need or want based on what you have been told the range of outcomes may be. There are 2 ideas here. Firstly, if both parties have had proper advice, the range of outcomes communicated to them will likely overlap. When there is an overlap in the advice both parties have received, settlement is more likely because there is common ground. Secondly, rather than negotiate by way of “Dutch auction”, try and form an understanding of the other party’s needs and motivations. If the parties understand each other it may be possible to think outside the box and achieve the settlement most mutually beneficial;
  3. Negotiate by email or in writing. Settlement communications prima facie can’t be used in court by virtue of section 131 Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), and the common law regarding privilege attached to settlement negotiations. If in doubt you can add the words, “without prejudice” to your communications;
  4. Once an agreement is reached, return to the lawyers to have the agreement drafted into the proper form.

Having a consent order application, parenting plan or binding financial agreement drafted without the costs of the “back and forth” between lawyers can save a lot of money.

If you can’t communicate with your spouse directly; or if there is power imbalance through intimidation or family violence; the lawyers and mediators may be the only option to assist with the negotiation process.

If it is the case there is acrimony, negotiation is difficult or court is unavoidable, there are some strategies you can use to reduce your legal fees:

  1. Most lawyers time cost so limit your communications to what is absolutely necessary;
  2. Provide detailed instructions in writing so your lawyer doesn’t have to chase you for information;
  3. Ask your lawyer if they can provide you with blank court family law forms in a Word format. If not, please note all of the court documents and some very useful fact sheets can be found on the Family Court and Federal Circuit Court websites (we have commonly used forms available on our website). Providing your lawyer with instructions in this format can reduce time and thus costs to you;
  4. Provide your lawyer with a detailed relationship chronology in a Word format. The chronology should start at the beginning of the relationship and specify all of the important dates and occurrences. You should do a different chronology for property and children. In documents such as this stick to the facts and avoid statements of opinion or submissions;
  5. If your lawyer asks you to obtain information or documents, be proactive. Costs can be reduced by avoiding the necessity for the lawyer to chase you up; and if the matter moves quickly without dragging on costs will likely be reduced;
  6. Consider the “cost benefit analysis” when examining the other party’s proposal. Is what you’re fighting about worth the cost? Costs in family law matters are not just financial. There is a lot of stress associated with the process and if children are involved it is very beneficial to try and preserve a future working relationship with the other party;
  7. Read your costs agreement and ask for estimates of costs before major work is undertaken.

Reducing costs can be achieved by working with your lawyer and by keeping the issue of costs clearly understood between you and your lawyer.”

Article – PDF – Succession planning

Blended families and second marriages can be challenging; and statistically second marriages are more likely to end in divorce than first marriages.[i]  For many people in this situation, often middle aged or later in life[ii], one concern is how can assets be best protected moving towards retirement and/or preserved for the children of the first marriage in the event of separation or death?

The potential claims

The potential claims that might arise from a second spouse/partner are typically those pursuant to the Family Law Act 1975 (“FLA”) with respect to property adjustment/spousal maintenance in the event of relationship breakdown[iii]; or a family provision claim.

A family provision claim is made pursuant to the Succession Act 1981 (“Succession Act”) in the event of death. This might be an issue where there are children from a first marriage who benefit under the will. A family provision claim is against the estate and arises if the deceased spouse does not make adequate provision in the will for the surviving spouse.

The difficulty for clients with respect to the above is:

  • High costs of family law litigation in the event of dispute; or high legal costs for the estate in family provision litigation;
  • These types of claims involve discretionary remedies which creates a degree of uncertainty as to the outcome;
  • Acrimonious dispute between spouses/partners; or between the children of the first marriage and spouse/partner.

What protection can the law offer?

Methods of asset protection such as via corporate or trust structures are of little assistance in the family law arena.-It is well settled that the real issue for the court in determining whether the matrimonial property pool ought to be expanded by trust or corporate assets is control.[iv]

Thus the court can look behind the veil and determine whether the facts and circumstances support a conclusion that assets ought to be included as “matrimonial property”.

Since 2000 (and 2009 for defacto couples) changes to the FLA make it possible for persons contemplating a relationship/marriage; or in a relationship/marriage; to contract out of the property adjustment/spousal maintenance provisions by entering into a Binding Financial Agreement.

What is a Binding Financial Agreement?

A Binding Financial Agreement is a Financial Agreement that is binding because it has met the formal requirements of the FLA necessary to make it binding.[v]-Where a Financial Agreement is binding, it removes the jurisdiction of a court to make a property adjustment or spousal maintenance order.[vi]

Thus the Binding Financial Agreement can specify matters such as how property is to be distributed, whether property brought to a relationship is to be retained or quarantined out of the property pool available for distribution, whether spousal maintenance is payable and the extinguishment of future spousal maintenance claims.

Third parties can be parties to Binding Financial Agreements and thus inter entity transfer of property is possible as well as making allowances for loans from family members etc.

What happens to a Binding Financial Agreement when a party to the agreement passes away?

A Binding Financial Agreement operates despite the death of a party and is binding on the personal representative of a party.[vii]

Opinions are divided however as to whether a Binding Financial Agreement for married couples becomes operative upon the death of a party. The significance of this would be to allow the Binding Financial Agreement to be used as a succession planning tool i.e. the Binding Financial Agreement would specify what joint property (or even property in the name of the surviving spouse) would fall into the deceased estate upon the death of a party pursuant to the Binding Financial Agreement.

The arguments for and against concern the wording of a number of sections[viii] (see endnote for explanation and why I think Binding Financial Agreements have force and effect on death) however there may be other provisions included in a Binding Financial Agreement that make a Binding Financial Agreement useful as a succession planning tool and protect against a family maintenance provision claim.

Binding Financial Agreements and family provision claims

Apart from the Binding Financial Agreement potentially being used to include or exclude assets from an estate, there is also potential to use the Binding Financial Agreement to “contract out of” the family maintenance provisions of the Succession Act.

In this respect the Binding Financial Agreement cannot remove the jurisdiction of the court to make an order because the Succession Act is Queensland legislation while the FLA is Federal legislation. Nevertheless a provision in the Binding Financial Agreement to the effect that neither party shall make a claim on the estate of the other, while not binding on a State Court, may represent important evidence of the intention of the parties and with respect to what “family provision” was considered adequate by the parties. This was the case in Queensland in Hills v Chalk & Ors (as executors of the estate of Chalk (deceased)) [2008] QCA 159where the court said at 46:

“In this case, the voluntary statement of the parties of their mutual intentions and expectations in a form intended to be binding affords a reliable conspectus of the totality of the relationship of the parties and of their respective relationships with others who have a claim on their bounty. In my opinion, the court should have regard to such a voluntary statement by the parties of their intentions and expectations…”

Further, in other jurisdictions the succession laws have been amended to permit parties to contract out of family maintenance provisions. For example, section 95  of the NSW Succession Act 2006  provides a person may contract out of/release their rights to a family provision order[ix]. A clause can be inserted into the Binding Financial Agreement in contemplation of the succession law in Queensland being amended to allow for a similar provision.

Getting a Binding Financial Agreement?

Some people may argue that a Binding Financial Agreement in contemplation of marriage or “pre nuptial agreement” is unromantic or demonstrates a lack of commitment. Maybe…but having this discussion at a time when both parties are in love and looking to the future could also be said to be a preferable time to negotiate what is fair as opposed to during the period of emotional turmoil at the end of a relationship.

For people with children to another relationship and assets hard earned it makes sense to obtain the best protection the law can offer.

For people wanting to leave behind a legacy to children and others, rather than leaving behind court battles and an estate ravaged by legal costs, a Binding Financial Agreement can offer more certainty and protection for loved ones. Many lawyers will understand that often claims such as family provision claims may be settled and paid out even if they are without merit simply to avoid the legal costs of defending them.

The Binding Financial Agreement doesn’t have to be entered into at the start of the relationship; it can be made during and even after the relationship has broken down.

Binding Financial Agreements are very helpful provided they are created by a skilled lawyer. Strict legislative requirements are necessary to make them binding and in some circumstances they can be set aside.

Two idioms best capture the essence of Binding Financial Agreements, they are: a stitch in time save nine but a chain is only as strong as its weakest link.

 


[i] Australian Institute of Family Studies

[ii] 2011 Census data show that in 2011 the median age in Australia for males to become separated was 40.8 with divorce occurring at 44.4 while for females the median age for separation was 38.1 and 41.5 for divorce.

[iii] Since 1 March 2009 most de facto couples in Queensland separating after that date are able to seek remedies pursuant the Family Law Act 1975 which are in most respect the same as those available to married couples.

[iv] Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Austin (1998) 16 ACLC 1,555; and Coventry, Coventry and Smith (2004) FLC 93-184.

[v] See sections 90G and 90UJ FLA.

[vi] See sections 71A and 90SA FLA.

[vii] See sections 90H and 90UK FLA.

[viii] Section 90H and 90UK are mirror provisions for married and defacto Binding Financial Agreements (“BFA”) except that the s.90UK provision contains a note which reads, “If the parties are still in the defacto relationship when one of them dies the de facto relationship is not taken to have broken down for the purposes of enforcing the matters mentioned in the financial agreement. Because section 90H doesn’t have a similar note it could be argued it is intended to mean death constitutes relationship breakdown for the purposes of the BFA. The difficulty with this is sections 90B(2) and 90C(2) refer to marriage “breakdown” which the definition in section 4 provides “in relation to a marriage, does not include a breakdown of the marriage by reason of death”.

The above would seem to put the matter beyond issue except for sections 90DA(1) and 90DA(1A). Section 90DA(1) requires that upon marriage breakdown, a BFA has no force or effect until a party signs a separation declaration. Section 90DA(1A) provides that section 90DA(1) does not need to be complied with if either or both spouses die. The note to section 90DA(1A) goes on to say:-“This means the financial agreement will be of force and effect in relation to the matters mentioned in subsection (1) from the time of the divorce or death(s)” (my emphasis). Thus the section clearly indicates a BFA has force and effect from the time of death.

In further support of this idea is section 90B(3)(b) and 90C(3)(b). This section provides that the BFA may contain “other matters” i.e. other matters in addition to how in the event of breakdown the property, financial resources and spousal maintenance is dealt with. It is submitted “other matters” might refer to how in the event of death the property, financial resources and spousal maintenance is dealt with.

A BFA is not terminated by death. Section 90J provides a BFA can “only” be terminated by including a terminating clause in a subsequent BFA (as referred to in sections 90B, 90C and 90D) or by making a “terminating agreement”. Therefore if the BFA is still operative, the surviving spouse could choose whether to sign the separation declaration in section 90DA(1) and give the BFA “force and effect”. Presumably this is why section 90DA(1A) was inserted and in my view gives further weight to the argument that BFA’s have force and effect on death of a party.

[ix] The release of rights to a family provision order in NSW requires the courts approval and other findings with respect to advantage to the releasing party; that it was prudent, fair and reasonable; and the releasing party had independent advice.

 

Peter Hooper – Hooper Mill Family Lawyers – We are family lawyers in Brisbane. Find us searching family lawyers Brisbane; divorce lawyers Brisbane; family lawyer Brisbane; Brisbane family lawyers; family law solicitors Brisbane; divorce lawyer Brisbane; family law lawyers Brisbane; divorce solicitors Brisbane; divorce lawyers in Brisbane; best divorce lawyer Brisbane.

PDF – The Full Court of the Family Court sheds more light on Stanford and the 4 step process

Some recent developments in the law with respect to matrimonial property adjustment orders have the potential to cause a significant rethink as to how lawyers have approached advising clients with respect to entitlement pursuant to section 79 Family Law Act 1975.

The High Court decision in Stanford[i] makes it clear the requirement for the court to determine whether it is “just and equitable”[ii] to make a matrimonial property adjustment order is a “precondition” to exercising the power conferred by section 79(4).[iii]

Arguably this should be obvious from a perusal of the section. Section 79(2) reads:

“The court shall not make an order under this section unless it is satisfied that, in all the circumstances, it is just and equitable to make the order” (my emphasis)

As was pointed out by Professor Parkinson in his article “Family Property Law and the Three Fundamental Propositions in Stanford and Stanford”, the notion of Section 79(2) being a positive requirement rather than a restraint on the power is not new, and similar comments had been made in high profile decisions over the years including in Mallet v Mallet.[iv]

The difficulty for lawyers with the idea of the “justice and equity” requirement being considered first is that a long line of decisions notably set out in Hickey and Hickey[v] made it clear the preferred approach to exercise of the discretion in section 79 followed 4 steps, the last step of which was the “justice and equity” step:

“The case law reveals that there is a preferred approach to the determination of an application brought pursuant to the provisions of s.79. That approach involves four inter-related steps. Firstly, the Court should make findings as to the identity and value of the property, liabilities and financial resources of the parties … Secondly, the Court should identify and assess the contributions of the parties …Thirdly, the Court should identify and assess the relevant matters referred to in… s.75(2)…Fourthly, the Court should consider the effect of those findings and determination and resolve what order is just and equitable in all the circumstances of the case.”[vi] (My emphasis)

To add to the confusion, Stanford sets out how the justice and equity statutory precondition ought to be satisfied by having regard to “3 fundamental propositions” which in some respects resemble the 4 step process. The three fundamental propositions are:

  1. Begin by considering whether it is just and equitable by identifying according to common law and equitable principles the existing interests of the parties;
  2. The exercise of discretionary power pursuant to section 79 must be exercised according to legal principles and not in an unguided manner. The judge exercising the power is not entitled to do “palm tree justice”;
  3. The court can not begin from the starting point of assuming any adjustment of proprietary interests is necessary. A determination that a party has a right to a property adjustment only fixed by reference to the matters in section 79(4) and without separate consideration of section 79(2) would erroneously conflate what are distinct statutory requirements.[vii]

So what of Hickey and the 4 step process?

Fortunately for those of us in the trenches wondering whether we still ought to be explaining the four step process to our clients, the Full Court of the Family Court has come to the rescue with Bevan & Bevan [2013] FamCAFC 116 delivered 8 August 2013.

This decision examines Stanford and provides guidance as to how treating section 79(2) as a precondition may be reconciled with the 4 step process.

In Bevan the Full Court noted the High Court in Stanford had not disavowed (nor approved) the 4 step process[viii].

In examining the post Stanford approach to the preliminary justice and equity question, Bevan makes a number of important points. The Full Court said:

  • It would be a “fundamental misunderstanding to read Stanford as suggesting the matters referred to in section 79(4) should be ignored” in determining the preliminary justice and equity question. While the Court recognised the warning in Stanford not to conflate the section 79(2) and section 79(4) issues, it was recognised in the majority of cases the justice and equity preliminary issue will be readily satisfied.[ix]

The second and third fundamental principles seem to invite an examination of section 79(4) with respect to the preliminary question, and add further resemblance to steps 2 and 3 of the 4 step process. It is submitted the reference to “legal principles” and not doing “palm tree justice” as well as not “beginning from the starting point of assuming any adjustment of proprietary interests is necessary” seem to be most appropriately grounded in section 79(4) i.e. an examination of contribution and section 75(2) matters.

The Full Court referred at 88 to a paper by Martin Bartfeld QC where he opined there was scope for considering section 79(4) matters in section 79(2).

Mr Bartfield QC says the contribution and section 75(2) factors must be treated as having 2 characteristics. Firstly, a discretionary characteristic used to identify those matters relevant to enliven the exercise of the discretion i.e. contributions over a long period may provide a basis for a finding it is just and equitable to make an order in accordance with the statutory precondition in Stanford. Secondly, an evaluative characteristic to measure, weigh or quantify the effect of the contribution or future factor (i.e. steps 2 and 3 of the 4 step process – assessment of contributions and future factors).

  • At 87 the Court referred to the decision of Strauss J in Ferguson and Ferguson where His Honour said that section 79(2) “is directed to both the questions of whether an order should be made at all, and what order should be made, if one is made at all.”[x] Thus the Stanford precondition to determine whether an order should be made is not inconsistent with the fourth step in Hickey.

The Full Court said:

“We do not consider it helpful, and indeed it is misleading, to describe this separate enquiry as a threshold issue…the justice and equity requirement is therefore not a threshold issue, but rather one permeating the entire process.”[xi]

So what is the process?

It is submitted two separate exercises are required:

  • Firstly to determine the justice and equity preliminary question in accordance with the 3 fundamental principles from Stanford (which requires an examination of section 79(4) from the perspective of whether it is just and equitable to make an order);
  • Secondly, if the first question is answered in the affirmative, to follow the 4 steps referred to in Hickey culminating in again considering whether the orders proposed to be made are just and equitable. This is because the requirement to do justice and equity is not a threshold issue but rather one permeating the entire process.

In practice the first exercise will often rarely need to be conducted on other than a cursory level. The Court in Bevan[xii] referred to paragraph 42 of Stanford where it was acknowledged:

In many cases where an application is made for a property settlement order, the just and equitable requirement is readily satisfied by observing that, as the result of a choice made by one or both of the parties, the husband and wife are no longer living in a marital relationship. It will be just and equitable to make a property settlement order in such a case because there is not and will not thereafter be the common use of property by the husband and wife…Hence it will be just and equitable that the court make a property settlement order. What order, if any, should then be made is determined by applying s 79(4).

Thus in practice it is submitted unless the preliminary justice and equity question can be flagged by unusual factual circumstance (such as those in Stanford and Bevan) the preliminary question can be swiftly resolved in the mind of the lawyer; before moving on to provide the client with advice, usually following the 4 steps in Hickey as to a range of outcomes that would be just and equitable.

Most importantly it is submitted these decisions highlight the practice of not overlooking the importance of section 79(2) in favour of moving directly towards assessing a client’s case under section 79(4). Of this the Court said in Bevan:

“It appears to have been routinely assumed by litigants, certainly in recent times, that justice and equity requires the court to assess their claims by reference to section 79(4)…”[xiii]

It is also submitted this practice may have come about by only regarding justice and equity as the final step in the four step process, after a “result” had been determined.

In practice for the future the consequences of Stanford may be more far reaching than simply being alert to justice and equity issues in some matters. One consequence may be greater scrutiny of circumstances such as short marriages with no children, or where finances are kept separate, where previously some entitlement may have been assumed.

 


[i] [2012] HCA 52 (15 November 2012)

[ii] Section 79(2) Family Law Act 1975

[iii] Stanford[2012] HCA 52 (15 November 2012) at 24

[iv] Parkinson “Family Property Law and the Three Fundamental Propositions in Stanford and Stanford” in Aust Family Lawyer Autumn 2013, Vol 23 No2 at page 6

[v] (2003) FLC 93-143

[vi] Hickey and Hickey (2003) FLC 93-143 at 39

[vii] Stanford[2012] HCA 52 (15 November 2012) at 37 to 40

[viii] Bevan & Bevan [2013] FamCAFC 116 at 65

[ix] Bevan & Bevan [2013] FamCAFC 116 at 84 and 85

[x] Bevan & Bevan [2013] FamCAFC 116 at 87

[xi] Bevan & Bevan [2013] FamCAFC 116 at 86

[xii] Bevan & Bevan [2013] FamCAFC 116 at 69

[xiii] Bevan & Bevan [2013] FamCAFC 116 at 68

Peter Hooper – Hooper Mill Family Lawyers – We are family lawyers in Brisbane. Find us searching family lawyers Brisbane; divorce lawyers Brisbane; family lawyer Brisbane; Brisbane family lawyers; family law solicitors Brisbane; divorce lawyer Brisbane; family law lawyers Brisbane; divorce solicitors Brisbane; divorce lawyers in Brisbane; best divorce lawyer Brisbane.

Children want greater say in Family Court cases – ABC News (Australian Broadcasting Corporation)

This is a very interesting article.

As was identified in the article, the most common method of ascertaining a child’s view is via the family report process.

A child’s view is a factor in determining the best interests of a child with age and level of maturity being relevant to weight. Further, in my experience often the recollections, opinion and/or attitude of a child is a good indicator of the nature and quality of the relationship of the child with both parents and relevant to the primary factor of the benefit to the child of maintaining a meaningful relationship with both parents. Arguably in the polarised world of family law litigation what the child has to say might often be the most honest account of what is really going on in a house hold.

A family report by an expert is generally considered to be the preferred method of facilitating communication between child and court. In my experience the main reason for this seems to be concern that children need to be shielded from the parental dispute, “systems abuse” may occur if a child is overly or unnecessarily exposed to forensic examination and lawyers are not qualified to engage with children in these types of interactions.

Interestingly when I attended the Independent Children’s Lawyer (“ICL”) course in Brisbane in 2012 it was discussed how infrequently ICL’s took the opportunity to speak with subject children even though the ability exists for them to do so.

Section 60CD(2)(c) provides the court has power, subject to the applicable rules of court, to inform itself of a child’s view by such other means as the court thinks appropriate, which includes the child communicating with the judge.

Children cannot be compelled to have their say but when they wish to do so, and express this strongly, perhaps ICL’s and judges have been unnecessarily gun shy in failing to facilitate the child becoming more involved.  The essence of the parenting order process is giving paramountcy to the rights of the child and I wonder if a typical child would be too adversely affected by engaging with a judge (or ICL) as part of the process.

Of course it’s not as if Federal Circuit Court and Family Court judges have plenty of time on their hands to meet with, and hold discussions with children in all matters. The courts exercising jurisdiction under the Family Law Act are busy, and increasingly so. However in appropriate cases, where the necessity for judicial determination is likely, perhaps some greater consideration should be given to a more robust involvement of the subject child in the proceeding.

Peter Hooper – Hooper Mill Family Lawyers – We are family lawyers in Brisbane. Find us searching family lawyers Brisbane; divorce lawyers Brisbane; family lawyer Brisbane; Brisbane family lawyers; family law solicitors Brisbane; divorce lawyer Brisbane; family law lawyers Brisbane; divorce solicitors Brisbane; divorce lawyers in Brisbane; best divorce lawyer Brisbane.

RELATIVES of a couple who died at a nursing home 11 hours apart on the same day said their love story’s ending reflects their devotion over 65 years of marriage. news.com.au Article

The number of couples divorcing after 20 years of marriage has doubled in the past 10 years as more parents wait until the kids leave home to separate. Women’s Weekly Article

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